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Abstract 
 
In the experiments presented in this study, the researcher examined the possibility and found evidence 
suggesting the different uses of analogy in structuring, reminding and understanding novel information. 
Specifically, when given series of written passages that either shared structural similarity, literal similarity, 
surface attributes  or first order relations, individuals were likely to make interpretations that paralleled 
structural information from a previously read analogous scenario. In contrast with the great majority of 
existing research, as well as with some common conceptions about analogy use, this interpreting was done in 
the absence of direct didactical intervention other than text comprehension. Strikingly participants were able 
to draw inferences.  Findings from the experiments seem to suggest that surface attribute and literal 
similarity were quite influential in remindings and access whereas structural similarity appeared to be more 
sensitive to inference-drawing. The data were taking as supporting the evidence that a) different types of 
similarity affect analogies differently; b) that inference-drawing and elaboration can take place automatically 
in text comprehension.    
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1. Introduction  
 
Reasoning by analogy is a fundamental component in human cognition. Analogy provides a tool for 
thought and explanation. Its role has been critical in scientific discoveries and creative thinking. It is 
precisely because of this that its fundamental role in reasoning has been the focus of attention in 
cognitive psychology. It is through analogy that many classic scientific discoveries were made.  A well 
known example is that of Archimedes in the 3rd century B.C. When asked to determine whether a base 
metal had been substituted for gold in an intricately designed crown, although the weight per volume of 
pure gold was known, the crown was so ornate that its volume was impossible to measure. He was 
unable to solve this solution until he went home and stepped into his bath: he saw an analogy between 
the volume of water displaced by his body as he got into his bath, and the volume of water that would 
be displaced by the crown. The problem was solved. 
Another classic example of analogy in science is Kepler’s analogy between religion and the 
relationship between the motion of the planets and their distance from the sun. It was concerned 
primarily with three problems, namely, the number, size and motion of the planets and the analogy 
between the stationary objects, namely, the sun, the fixed stars, and the space between them, with God 
the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost. The analogy mapped out as follows: ‘The sun in the middle of 
the moving stars, himself at rest and yet the source of motion carries the image of God the Father and 
the Creator. He distributes his motive force through a medium which contains moving bodies, even as 
E-ISSN 2281-4612 
ISSN 2281-3993        
Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 
Published by MCSER-CEMAS-Sapienza University of Rome                              
                                Vol 2 No 1 
March 2013 
 
   
 110 
the Father creates through the Holy Ghost. Thus analogy eventually led Keppler to an operational 
theory of celestial mechanics that resulted in the notion of gravity. 
Thus analogies are important in learning, problem solving and discovery. The paradox however is 
that developmental psychology, for example, has not given central role to analogy. Goswani (1992) has 
offered the explanation that this neglect was partly historical: namely, the over-emphasis on Piagetian 
theory which asserts that reasoning by analogy was a late-developing skill around 11-12 years of age. 
This traditional view was supported by research in psychometrics. Psychometrics research had shown 
that many children, even at 11-12 years of age, were unable to complete simple analogies like pig: boar:: 
dog:? (wolf). When given these analogies, younger children typically produced responses, like pig:boar :: 
dog : cat (Goswani,1992, p. 4). 
Much of human experience however is essentially analogical. Analogy entails mapping the problem 
representation (target) into a structurally similar schema (base), which has been learnt through 
experience. Two sources of difficulty are foreseen in analogical reasoning:  mapping problems to 
inappropriate schemas, and processing loads imposed by mapping; the more complex the mapping, the 
greater the load. Gentner, (1983) for example, defines analogies as mapping from a base to a target. In 
the simple proportional analogy, “human is to baby” as “horse is to foal” is the target. Elements in the 
base are mapped into the target. In this case, all mappings are bi-directional, unless indicated otherwise, 
so it does not matter whether they are described from base to target or the reverse.  
In the thinking of Halford (1992) when “human” is mapped into “horse” and “baby” into “foal”, 
the relation of “parent of” in the base there corresponds to the same relation in the target. In other 
words, the corresponding relation in the base and the target need not be identical (Halford, 1992, p. 
194). For example, not all attributes of base and target elements are mapped such as the human attribute 
“walks on two legs” is not mapped to horse. The implication here is that relations are mapped 
selectively. It is these relations that enter into coherent structure that are more likely to be mapped. In 
the thinking of Gentner (1983) this is referred to as the principle of systematicity. Thus according to 
this view, the important thing in analogy is to establish that the base and the target are in structural 
correspondence.  
Thus, the one most important issue that underscores all the research work on the different models 
of analogy, whether, it is from the point of view of pragmatic reasoning (Holyoak), componential 
reasoning (Sternberg)  or the structural model (Gentner)  is the important role of similarity. Analogical 
inference (and transfer for that matter) can take place to the effect that the subject can see salient 
features or similarity between the base or one’s knowledge and the target or the transferred task.  
 
2. Statement of Problem  
 
Research findings corroborate the hypothesis that there is a correlation between analogy types and 
retrievability and inference-making. Ross (1989) in a study of transfer in problem solving measured not 
only the proportion of correct solution, but also the proportion of remindings, as measured by whether 
subject wrote out a prior formula. This allows a contrast to be made between solution rate (a measure 
which presumably includes mapping, adaptation, evaluation and drawing of inferences and reminding 
rate) which was relatively strongly affected by surface similarity. Novick (1988) gave both novice and 
expert mathematicians’ problems to solve that included both surface similarity distractors and remote 
analogies, followed by later target problem. Initially both novices and experts retrieved surface 
similarities, but experts were quicker to reject initially incorrect retrievals, suggesting stronger effects of 
domain knowledge in mapping and evaluation than in retrieval. Gick and Holyoak (1983, 1987) 
demonstrated that a literally similar prior story was retrieved more often than on mapping and use. It is 
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within this context of subjects attending more to surface similarity rather than structural that has made 
other scholars in cognitive psychology and education deny that transfer is spontaneous.  
 
“Transfer is rare, and the likelihood of its occurrence is related to the similarity between two 
situations” (Detterman & Sternberg, 1993, p. 15).  
 
and 
 
“There is no good evidence that people produce significant amounts of transfer or that they can be 
taught to do so. There is on the other hand, substantial evidence and an emerging Zeitgeist that 
favours the idea that what people learn are specific examples... I subscribe to the principle that you 
should teach people exactly what you want them to learn in a situation as close as possible to the one 
in which the learning will be applied. I don’t count on transfer and I don’t try to promote it” 
(Detterman & Sternberg, 1993, pp. 17). 
 
Notwithstanding the above claim, other research as mentioned above do claim that there is not 
only transfer, but that there are indeed different types of analogies that exert differential effects on 
retrievability and inference-making (Gentner, Ratterman & Forbus 1993). Thus, if these studies that 
make such claims are anything to go by, then one can reasonably imply that some types of analogies can 
enhance spontaneous transfer especially in the area of making inferences in text comprehension.  As 
these and countless other examples demonstrate, analogy provides a useful tool for reasoning about 
poorly understood situations, solving difficult problems, and making plausible inferences about 
unknown properties, behaviors, and characteristics (Gentner & Markman, 1997; Holyoak & Thagard, 
1995; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997).  
This research examines more closely the roles of similarity in transfer; specifically how the 
different types of analogies (surface similarity) and structural analogy (structural similarity) affects 
retrieval access and inference-making with reference to text comprehension. However, most research 
works on analogy with the exception of few have arrived at evidence with some form of instructional 
intervention and training from a previously read scenario in problem solving. In this study however, 
while assessing the differential effects of analogy types on retrievability and inferential induction in text 
comprehension, it also seeks to investigate whether or not there is spontaneous evidence of inferential 
transfer in text comprehension without didactic intervention. In short, whereas many researchers arrive 
at conclusion through an exposure of experimental groups to didactic intervention, this study seeks 
evidence non-intentionally (Day & Gentner, 2007).   
 
3. Research Questions  
 
In the light of this defined problem, this research attempted to respond to three fundamental questions:  
1)How is accuracy of recall of text dependent on the degree of surface similarities? (surface 
match)?;  
2)Do people fail to infer structurally appropriate analogies in text comprehension? 
3)Why is transfer likely to occur to the extent in which base and target share surface similarity? 
 
4. Hypothesis 
 
The fundamental hypothesis of this research is this:  
a) Individuals are more likely to recall passages that shared surface similarity more than 
those with structural similarities; 
E-ISSN 2281-4612 
ISSN 2281-3993        
Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 
Published by MCSER-CEMAS-Sapienza University of Rome                              
                                Vol 2 No 1 
March 2013 
 
   
 112 
b) With respect to inference-making, individuals, who made use of structural similarities, are 
more likely to make better inferences. 
c) Analogical transfer is likely to occur to the extent in which base and target share surface 
similarity? 
Thus, the ability to transfer from a prior (base) knowledge to a target knowledge for fluent text 
comprehension is a function of two types of analogy each of which has differential impact in text 
comprehension: These two types of analogies are: a) remote analogy and b) within-analogy. Each has 
different cognitive function. Whereas remote analogy is crucial to inference-making and text elaboration, 
within-analogy aids access to retrieving surface contextual features.  Each of the two types of analogy is 
differentially crucial for retrievability and inference.  
 
5- Method of testing the hypothesis  
 
This hypothesis was tested experimentally by exposing Second Year Education students in the Catholic 
University of Ghana to written passages in a text in which some of the passages were superficially very 
similar, while others were on the surface very dissimilar and yet shared structural similarity. Other facts 
in some of the passages were left unstated or ambiguous.  
Subjects: 30 Second Year Education students in Psychology Class, Catholic University of Ghana.   
 
5.1 Design and Materials 
 
Similarity types were varied within the subjects. In all, subjects read a total of 24 short stories in groups 
of three that is each group of 10 students read 8 stories. The first and the last stories were filler stories 
in addition to the main 6 stories in each group.  Measurement was on the dimension of students recall 
along the following scales: ratings of their recall, proportion of recall rated above criterion, and 
proportion of recall of significant key word in each story.  The stories were short ones of about two or 
three paragraphs. Each of the main 18 stories contained the following: an original story, three matching 
cue stories which differed in amount and level of similarity that they share with the original. All cues 
shared identical or nearly identical first order relations (e.g. events and actions) with the original story. 
They differed in other level of shared similarity. 
There were three sets of cues: a) analogy cues, b) surface similarity match cues, and c) first order 
match cues.  Analogy cues consisted of common higher order relational structure added to the first order 
relational matches; surface similarity match cues (SS) object matches were added to the first order 
relations matches. The higher order relational structure (which had to do with causal relations  or plot 
structure differed; first order match (FOR) cues consisted only of the first order relation match.  Each 
subject received only one matching cue story for each of the 18 main stories. All subject received the 
same memory set with differences only in the type of story used in the cue set. Comparability was 
ensured by making the cue stories as similar as possible. The use of identical words was avoided in order 
to ensure avoidance of lexical meanings in cueing.  
Reminding task:  subjects were tested in groups of three consisting of 10 students in each group in 
two separate sessions. In session one, students read a booklet containing the 18 original stories plus the 
6 filler stories. All subjects read the same 24 stories in different semi-random orders with the order to 
read the stories carefully so that they would be able to remember them carefully. They took 35 minutes 
for this task. The second session took place later the same day without any didactic intervention. 
Students received booklet that contained the 18 stories they read earlier. Each workbook consisted of six 
surface similarity cues (SS), six analogy (AN) cues and six first order rules (FOR) cues. They were told 
that for each cue they were to write any original story for which they reminded. If they were reminded of 
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more than one, they should write the one that best matched the current story: they were asked to include 
as many details as possible that they could remember.  
Inference-drawing task: After completing the reminding task, students were asked to draw 
inference in the second session. The task was this: they were given the same stories as in the first session 
and were asked to  rate six  surface similarity (SM), six analogy(AN) and six first order rule (FOR) 
matches in the same order as in the  reminding  task. They were asked to rate each pair for the inference 
of the match explaining inference as the situation in which the essential aspect of the stories match for 
one to draw conclusions about the second story from the first. 
Scoring: was done using 0-5 mean scale as follows:  5= All important elements of the original and 
many details; 4= all important elements of the original and some details; 3= all important elements of 
the original but very few or no details; 2= some important elements of the original; others missing or 
wrong; 1= some elements from the original but not enough to be certain that the subjects genuinely 
recalled the original; 0= no recall or different story.  
In the third research question, subjects were the same as in questions 1 and 2 with the same 
materials except that only AN matches and two kinds of surface matches were used. Each subject was 
given seven analogy matches (AN) and seven superficial matches. For half of the subjects the superficial 
matches shared only object descriptions and not first order event nor causal structure. The other half 
received SS matches of the same kind used in the previous experiments which shared first order relations 
as well as objects. Each subject in addition received six LS matches (the same six across all subjects. 
Procedure was also the same as in questions 1 and 2 except that this time round the keyword scoring 
was dropped. First session:  subjects read twenty original stories and 12 filler stories.  Second session: 
Later they were given 20 matching stories in the reminding task. 
 
6. Clarification of terms and acronyms  
 
As used in this study, the term literal similarity means that both relational predicates and object 
attributes share some similarities; whereas surface similarity is mere appearance matches in which only 
object-attributes and low order relations are shared. Analogy is used in this study to mean structural 
similarity as opposed to surface similarity or literal similarity. The same term is also used synonymously 
as ‘across-domain analogy’ or ‘remote analogy’ which appears to be sensitive ‘inference-making’ and 
elaboration in text comprehension in contradistinction to ‘within-domain analogy’ which is also used 
synonymously as ‘surface similarity’. Thus within-domain analogy or surface similarity seems to be 
compatible with recall.  The acronyms used in the experiments are: AN= Analogy; SS= Surface 
similarity; LS= Literal similarity; FOR= First order rules  
 
7. Theoretical framework  
 
Similarity is universally acknowledged to be central in transfer. Research suggests that its role is 
complex. People solve problems better if they have solved prior similar problems. This applies to both 
children and adults. One of the most enduring findings in the field is that transfer promotes reminding.  
The most fundamental ideal required to understand transfer is that two tasks may differ and yet share 
some common components.  This shared components provide the basis for inter task transfer. This 
notion of common components also sometimes referred to as ‘the theory of identical elements’ was first 
articulated by Thorndike in 1903. It is called ‘salient features’ or ‘overlapping rules’ in cognitive 
literature. 
Theorists explain that the continuous notion of similarity can be reduced to a function of discreet 
components: two situations are similar in so far as they share many common components. To a first 
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approximation, more common components will constitute greater similarity and therefore lead to greater 
transfer (Gick & Holyoak, 1987, p. 16). To be able to predict the overall magnitude of transfer and its 
direction (positive or negative), a more refined analysis of similarity is required. These distinctive aspects 
of transfer can be related to the impact of different types of similarity on the retrieval verses application 
of previously acquired knowledge.  
Specifically, what Gick and Holyoak are proposing here is that perceived similarity is a function of 
any salient similarity of two situations.  This perceived similarity will in turn affect retrieval of the 
representation of the training situation during transfer task:  the greater the perceived similarity of the 
two situations, the more likely it is that transfer will be attempted. If transfer in fact is attempted, the 
direction of the transfer will be determined by the similarity of the two situations with respect to 
features causally relevant to the goal or required response in the transfer task. It is crucial to understand 
the distinctions between the pragmatic approach to analogy in problem solving and that of the structural 
approach. The former is talking about ‘features causally relevant to the goal’ that will constrain the 
perceived similarity whereas the latter is emphasising the principle of systematicity.  
Components of a situation that are causally or functionally related in outcomes or goal attainment 
is referred to by Holyoak et al. (1987) as structural and those not so related will be termed surface 
(Holyoak, 1985). These authors argue within the context of problem solving analogies that salient 
common components of either a surface or a structural nature will increase the likelihood that a problem 
solver will relate the two situations to each other. In other words, salient surface or structural 
components will affect perceived similarity. Conditional on transfer being attempted at all, shared 
structural components will tend to yield positive transfer, as the solution of the initial problem is 
transferred in an appropriate way to the transfer task.  
The claim that analogy involves a mapping of information is a general assumption that is shared 
by most theories of analogy. The only difference however is that the factors that influence the mapping 
differ across theories. One of the most influential theories of how people use analogous solutions is the 
structure-mapping theory proposed by Gentner in 1983. The theory was primarily developed to account 
for mapping knowledge from a base domain onto a target domain that consisted of different objects, 
such as comparing an atom to a solar system. Because the objects differed, Gentner argued that it is the 
relations among the objects rather than the attributes of the objects that determined the mapping. 
 Thus, cognitive processing of analogies has been a fertile and productive area for research over the 
last two decades.  There is substantial consensus on the fundamental processes involved (Gentner, 2003; 
Gentner, Holyoak, & Kokinov, 2001; Gentner & Markman, 1997; Holyoak & Thagard, 1989; Hummel 
& Holyoak, 1997; Kokinov & French, 2003). A key characteristic of analogical theories is the emphasis 
on structured representations that specify the relations between elements. For example, in structure-
mapping theory (Forbus, Gentner, & Law, 1995; Gentner, 1983, 2003; Gentner & Markman, 1997), 
the comparison processes act to achieve a maxima structurally consistent alignment between two 
representations. Structural consistency entails that the correspondences between the elements and 
relations in two representations must satisfy one-to-one correspondence (an element in one 
representation may be mapped to at most one element in another) and parallel connectivity (if two 
predicates correspond, their arguments must also correspond). Once a structural alignment has been 
established, candidate inferences are projected. These are additional elements that are connected to the 
common system in the base (or source) structure but are not yet present in the target (Clement & 
Gentner, 1991; Markman, 1997). Importantly, in structure-mapping, such inferences arise automatically 
via a structural pattern completion process (Day & Gentner, 2007). 
Gentner, Ratterman and Forbus (1993) in a similar study examined the roles of similarity and 
how different types of analogies or similarities affect retrieval access and what they call ‘inferential 
soundness’. They attempted to isolate and compare the determinants of similarity-based access to 
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memory and the determinants of the subjective soundness and similarity match. Based on structure-
mapping theory, they predicted that subjective soundness would depend on the degree of shared 
relational structure, particularly high-order structure such as causal bindings. In contrast, they also 
predicted that memory retrieval would be highly sensitive to surface similarities such as common object 
attributes. To assess retrievability, they expose subjects to read a large set of stories and were later given 
a set of probe stories that resembled the original stories in systematically different ways, for example, 
purely relational analogies, surface-similarity matches or literal similarity matches. 
Research since the mid 80’s confirms the venerable tradition that similarity increases the 
probability of transfer (Anderson, Farrell & Sauer, 1984; Holyoak & Koh, 1987; Novick 1988; Pirroli, 
1985; Reed 1987; Ross, 1987; 1989; Simon & Hayes, 1976). At the same time research findings 
indicate that the roles of similarity in transfer are complex:  
1) First, that accuracy of transfer depends critically on the degree of structural match, that match 
causal structures (Schumacher & Gentner, 1988a, b; Holyoake & Koh, 1987) 
2) Second, people do not often succeed in accessing structurally appropriate materials, even when 
they are in the long term memory.  (Gick & Hoyoak,1980, 1983); 
3) Third, similarity-based reminding is often based on superficial commonalties and /or instead 
of structural commonalities (Gentner, Ratterman & Forbus, 1993: 526). 
Such findings suggest that there is more than one type of analogy and therefore there is the 
possibility of other types of analogies that seem to influence cognitive processes in transferring 
knowledge from a base towards a target, as for example, in comprehending a text. Genter et al (1993) 
distinguish between three types of analogy:  literal similarity, analogy and surface similarity (mere 
appearances). In literal similarity both relational predicates and object attributes are shared. In analogy 
(also called structural similarity) high order, structural relations are mapped and inferences are drawn.   
In surface similarity or (mere appearance matches), only object-attributes and low order relation are 
shared. There is a general consensus that in similarity-based transfer there are certain core cognitive 
processes that are involved:  1) accessing a potential analogy, 2) matching the base analogue with the 
target, 3) mapping further inferences from the base to the target, 5) evaluating the soundness of the 
analogy and 6) extracting the common structure for later use (J. Clement, 1986; Gentner, 1988a. It is 
on account of this that similarity based transfer is considered to involve four to six sub-processes: 
accessing, matching, evaluating, drawing inferences (with some adaptation of the analogy) and 
abstracting from the analogy (Genter, Ratterman & Forbus, 1993: 527).  
This brings us to the core claims of this paper: the suggestion that different kinds of similarity use 
different cognitive sub-processes. In so doing, they exert different effects on accessing and abstracting or 
drawing of inferences. Specifically this paper makes the submission that individuals are more likely to 
access and remember surface features in a text comprehension more than they would in respect of texts 
that may be structurally similar but have different surface features and context. Similarly even though 
accessing structurally similar text may be initially difficult, yet when they succeed in doing so it is more 
consolidated.  
 
8. Results and Discussion 
 
Research Question 1: How is accuracy of recall of text dependent on the degree of surface similarities?  
 
In this question, even though our interest was first and foremost to assess the degree of surface similarity 
in retrieving information from text, we also evaluated the link between inference-drawing and surface 
similarity.   
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On Inference-drawing:  As predicted, students were able to make more inferences with respect to 
those stories that shared higher-order relational structures (the analogy matches) than those pairs of 
stories that did not (the FOR matches and surface matches). Comparing the three variables in terms of 
mean scores, Analogy matches received 4 point mean rating; surface similarity 2.8 and first order rule 
2.6 rating. These findings were interpreted to mean that the three types of similarity matches have 
differential effects on inference. Analogy especially across-domain analogy is critical when it comes to 
higher level abstraction when one has to map higher orders from a base knowledge to target knowledge.  
This finding contradicts that of Holyoak (1983, 1987) that spontaneous transfer in problem solving 
without some form of instructional manipulation is very rare. Indeed in an unpublished doctoral 
dissertation of this author in 1998, the findings corresponded and corroborated with that of Holyoak 
(ibid). Out of a total of 240 Senior High School students that took part in the experiment to solve the 
radiation problem and other isomorphic problems only about 30% were able to solve the problem fully. 
However, when later exposed to didactical intervention on how to use analogy in problem solving, many 
of the students (57%) were able to solve similar problems after the instructional event.  
This notwithstanding, this same finding which contradicts that of Holyoak (ibid) also 
corroborates other study, such as Day and Gentner (2007) study of non-intentional text comprehension. 
How do we explain this apparent inconsistency? The inconsistency seems to suggest that analogical 
mapping though often viewed as an explicit deliberative process can sometimes operate without intent or 
even awareness: and this is especially so in text comprehension.  For example, when given a text such as: 
‘the robbers crossed the river and robbed the bank’.  Most readers can readily make the relevant mapping 
in this context, that the bank being referred to here  is not the bank of a river, (even though river is 
mentioned) but where money is saved  because of the context of the subject ‘robbers’. Thus the inference 
made of the bank (in which money is kept and not that of a river) in this instance is made on the basis 
of sound inference by an analogy that is not based on surface similarity per se.  Thus if this finding in 
this first experiment is anything to go by, it does seem to suggest some plausible answer to our first 
research question:  How is accuracy of recall of text dependent on the degree of surface similarity? The 
answer that this finding seems to suggest is this:  even though analogy matches were not well recalled 
compared to surface matches, they were nonetheless rated as inferential.   
 
Reminding 
 
The scores on this dimension (measured on a score of 2 or better) show a different pattern: on all three 
measures, Analogy (AN):0.5; surface similarity (SS) 0.8 and first order reminding (FOR) 0.3. On all 
three measures on reminding, the AN matches were less effective than the SS. Thus, whereas surface 
similarity was more effective in recall, analogy and first analogy order matches received fewer score. 
What the result seems suggest is that surface similarity is quite crucial in recall as opposed to making 
sound inferences. They produced greater proportion of remindings followed by AN and then by FOR 
matches supporting surface similarly superiority in retrieval. This shows a remarkable difference in the 
case of inference.  In the case of inference-drawing as predicted by structure-mapping theory, common 
higher-order relational structure is a crucial determinant of the subjective goodness of an analogy. 
Subjects rated AN matches as more sound than FOR matches whilst rating SS matches as no better than 
FOR matches. Thus, the result suggest that inference-drawing is not determined by the number of 
common features but seem to suggest that common higher-order relational structure is more crucial. 
Even though analogy matches were not well recalled, they were rated as inferential. The opposite was 
true for surface matches. This corroborates with the findings of Gentner et al (1993), Day and Gentner 
(2007), Reed (1987), Novick (1988). 
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Research Question 2: Do people fail to infer structurally appropriate analogies in text comprehension?   
The purpose of this second research question among others was to ensure that the subjective inference 
that were made by subjects in research question one (1) was not the result of extraneous factors such as 
cueing (that is students being biased by the experimenter to look out for higher order inferences ) as 
they read the texts in the first experiment.  One of the main criticisms against the ‘evidence’ for transfer 
is that subjects are subtly manipulated either through direct instruction or other form of cuing. Hence, 
this second question was to cross check gauging and biasing students.  It was to test why subjects often 
fail to access structurally appropriate analogies as compared to surface similarity analogies without any 
direct hint. They were given the materials in the first experiment and were asked to make inference.  
Students were measured along the following dimensions:  
Inference: They were given the instruction: ‘humans have intuitions about resemblances that seem 
weak or irrelevant. In this second question of the experiment, use your intuitions about when two 
situations match well enough to make a strong argument...’  
Sound match:  one in which essential aspects of the stories match: that is strong enough that one 
can infer or predict things about the second story from the first. 
Similarity: subjects read stories and rated them on 1-5 point rating scale with 5= extremely similar 
and 1=extremely dissimilar. 
Reminding: the procedure was as in Research Question 1. 
Inference: As predicted, in terms of mean rating, subjects scored a mean point of 5.4 on literal 
similarity that had common attributes and 5 point score on analogy with no common attributes on the 
YES, while there were low score for surface similarity of 2.3 on common attributes and 2.0 on first 
order relations with no common attributes on the NO for 67% the participating students. On literal 
similarity, there was a score of 5.2, AN= 4.8,   SS= 3. 4   and FOR = 2.8 students.   
Similarity:  Here the two groups of students ratings appeared to have shown some level of 
sensitivity to two types of commonalities: relational and object-attribute (see figure below). Literal 
similarity matches had score of (M= 4.60) over AN matches of (M= 4.10), of AN matches of over SS 
(M=3.45), and of SS matches over FOR matches (M=2.93).  The comparison between similarity and 
inference (soundness) is quite revealing: similarity like inference is sensitive to the presence of higher 
order relational structure.  
 
a) Mean soundness (inference rating) for  four similarity types in Research Question  2  
INFERENCE 
LS= (M=5.4)  
AN=(M= 5)  
SS= (M=2.3) 
FOR= (M=2.0) 
b) Mean similarity  ratings for  four similarity types  in Research Question 2 
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LS= (M=4.60) 
AN=(M= 4.10) 
SS= (M=3.45) 
FOR= (M=2.93) 
c)  Mean Reminding ratings for four similarity types in ResearchQuestion 2 
LS= (M= .52) 
AN=(M= .8)  
SS= (M=.49) 
FOR= (M=.05) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reminding: this pattern was different from that of inference and similarity. Object commonalities 
strongly contributed to memory access and higher order relational had little effect. The scores were as 
follows: LS (M=.52) and SS (M=.49) matches than AN (M=.8) and FOR (M=.05).   
Thus the answer to the second research question of this study: Do people fail to infer structurally 
appropriate analogies in text comprehension? The findings here seem to suggest that in text 
comprehension, people infer structurally appropriate analogies through the differential effects of 
different types of similarities, such as literal similarity matches which often  are greater than analogy 
matches, just as the latter is greater than surface similarity and surface similarity takes precedence over  
first order relations. All these types of similarities may be sensitive to both relational and object-attribute 
commonalities. The plausible answer to this second research question seems to be this: No, in text 
comprehension, people may infer structural analogy through a hierarchy of cognitive sub-processes of 
the different analogy types. In terms of reminding, higher order relations had negligible effect as 
compared to object commonalities which had a strong influence on memory access.   
Research Question 3: Why is transfer likely to occur to the extent in which base and target share surface 
similarity? 
 
Inference (soundness): Consistent with prediction, the rate of inference reflected the degree of relational 
overlap. The AN matches (M=3.80) were rated as significantly more sound than the SS matches (M= 
2.28). The soundness advantage of analogy over superficial similarity was greater for objects-only 
matches than for SS matches. 
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Similarity:   AN matches (M=4.04) were rated as more similar than SS matches (M= 3.24) and 
OO matches (M= 2.33) (within-group t (10) =6.53 and t(10)=2.99 respectively. SS matches were 
rated more similar than OO matches t(18)= 3.52. Also for soundness, the difference between AN and 
OO matches was greater than the difference between AN and SS matches t(20)= 2.81  
Reminding:  Again in this experiment as in the previous one, the pattern of the reminding differs 
from that of inference (soundness) and  similarity. Both SS matches (M=.50) and OO matches 
(M=.14) were better retrieved than AN matches (M=.05) within-subject t (20) =6.60 and t 
(20)=2.76. SS matches were better retrieved than OO matches t(50)=4.58. The anchoring LS were 
highly retrievable as expected (M=.60). 
The pattern of the quality of recall was similar. The mean quality of recall was significantly higher 
for SS matches (M= 1.42) than for OO matches (M=.44), t (20). Quality of recall was higher for both 
SS matches and OO matches than for AN matches (M=.19), t(20). As expected, LS matches received 
higher rating (M=1.76). The difference between the AN and the SS matches was greater than the 
difference between the AN and OO matches (t (20) =4.61). 
 
9. Constraints on these Effects 
 
The results of the findings indicate that analogical processes are capable of influencing text 
comprehension without cueing subjects. However, it must be pointed out that these findings are based 
on a relatively small set of experimental materials that were designed to test for such effects. Much 
research work remains to be done to isolate the scope of these kinds of processes. In fact, the present 
findings are quite surprising (as mentioned earlier on), when one takes cognizance of the fact that  quite 
a number of studies have shown little or no spontaneous transfer from single instances (Gick& Holyoak, 
1980, 1983; Holyoak & Koh, 1987; Keane,1988; Ross, 1987, 1989). Additionally, many studies have 
shown that comparison of two or more instances can produce impressive transfer when isolated 
instances cannot (Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989; Gentner, Loewenstein, & Thompson, 2003; Gick & 
Holyoak, 1983). This appears to indicate that this kind of effect may often require abstracted schemas 
rather than concrete instance representations. We can look to differences between the experiments 
presented in this study and previous research for clues about possible constraints on our effects. One 
potentially critical factor is the degree and kind of similarity between the base and target passages. 
Previous research such as (Gentner& Landers, 1985; Gentner et al., 1993; Holyoak & Koh, 1987), have 
established the importance of surface similarity in explicit analogical reminding giving indication of a 
dissociation between the kind of similarity that supports alignment and inferencing (i.e., structural 
similarity) and the kind that supports memory access to prior instances (i.e., surface similarity—similar 
characters, objects, and settings).  In the present study, the story pairs were high in both structural and 
surface similarity. 
Thus, it could be the case that spontaneous inferencing requires a high degree of surface similarity. 
However, there is some evidence (Catrambone, 2002; Gentner et al., 1993; Wharton, Holyoak, & 
Lange, 1996) that purely structural similarity also contributes to analogical reminding. This raises the 
question that possibly spontaneous transfer might occur even without surface similarity. These findings 
are therefore not absolute. One significant way in which the present study differs from past research is in 
the kind of inferences involved (Day & Genter, 2007). 
 
10. Conclusion 
 
This study began with the fundamental claim that analogy is central to human cognition. Our 
hypothesis was that there are different types of analogies that influence the processes of transfer, 
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inference drawing and memory access. This implies that the account of the effect of analogies requires 
making fine distinctions in analogies in transfer and text comprehension. This study specifically found 
that there is dissociation between the matches that people get from memory and those matches they 
want. Memory accessibility was found to be strongly influenced by surface commonalities but weakly 
influenced by structural commonalties. The contrast was that inference–drawing was strongly influenced 
by structural commonalties and not in any way influenced by surface commonalities. The implication of 
this finding is that in text comprehension, readers are more likely to access surface commonalities most 
of the time, yet in making inference and text elaboration, it is more likely that readers would attend to 
higher order relations and not surface similarities non -intentionally without realising that they are doing 
so.  
Inference-making: The findings of this study suggest the structure-mapping theory prediction 
which posits that subjective soundness of a similarity match is determined by the degree of relational 
structure overlap. The three experiments of the study bear this out. First when common relations are 
added as in the first experiment, it increases the perceived soundness of a match.  In every case where a 
precise comparison is possible the probability of inference-making is increased with the relational 
commonalities. For example, in both cases of research Question 1 and 2, when higher relations were 
added, analogies were judged more sound than first order matches. Similarly in research question 2, 
literal similarity matches were judged more sound than surface matches. In research question 3, surface 
matches were judged more sound than objects only matches.  
The second finding is this: adding higher-order commonalities to a first-order relational match 
increases inference-drawing (soundness) more than adding object commonalties. The three experiments 
bear out that the inference of analogical matches is substantially higher than that of surface matches.  
The third evidence that this study seems to underscores is also this:  the addition of object-
attribute commonalities fails to increase (inference-making) soundness. There is compatibility of these 
findings with other study such as Gentner et al (1993), Gentner and Clement (1988). 
Resonance Models of Activation: Our results seem to be compatible with those studies that have 
examined the role of general memory processes in the generation of inferences and maintenance of 
coherence in text, largely focusing on “resonance” models of memory activation (e.g., Gillund & Shiffrin, 
1984; Hintzman, 1986; Ratcliff, 1978; Day & Gentner, 2007). ‘Resonance’ models make the claim that 
there is selective parallel activation from the long term memory. This selective activation is contingent 
upon common overlap with concurrent working memory. According to Day and Gentner (2007), these 
approaches have been successfully used in the explanation of anaphor resolution and reactivation of 
distant, but relevant, information from earlier in a text (cf. O’Brien, 1995). Based on such data, it does 
not seem unreasonable to hypothesize that these kinds of processes could play a role in the effects found 
in the present experiments. The high degree of similarity between the source and target passages could 
have allowed resonance-type activation of the base passage as a whole, or even have supported more 
localized element-to-element mappings in the course of reading (Day & Gentner, 2007: 46). 
Similarity-based Access:  The results for access were the opposite of the results for inference-
making. Subjects had the tendency not to retrieve the matches they considered most sound. Rather they 
were more likely to access surface matches. There are three lines of evidence in this respect: a) combining 
object attributes to a match increased the proportion of retrieved. In the first two experiments, recall of 
surface matches was greater than recall for FOR matches. In the second experiment, recall of literal 
similarity matches was greater than recall of analogical matches; b) adding common object attributes 
contributes more to retrievalilibty than adding common higher-order reactions. In all three experiments 
recall of surface similarity was far greater than recall of analogical matches. The proportions of surface 
matches retrieved across three experiments were substantially higher than retrieval rate for analogies. 
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 Similarity: Accessibility and subjective soundness (inference-making) are both aspects of 
similarity. Adding subjective similarity resembled soundness in respects of its sensitivity to common 
structural relations. Adding relational information increased subjective similarity. Literal similarity 
matches were considered more similar than surface matches (Research Question 2); analogical matches 
were considered more similar than FOR-matches (Research Question t 2) and surface matches were 
considered object-only matches (Research Question 3). Another line of evidence is the comparative 
addition argument. Comparing the effect of higher-order commonalties verses adding object 
commonalties we find the following: analogies are rated as more similar than surface matches in both 
experiment 2 and 3. However, unlike soundness, similarity is increased by adding object commonalities 
and for this literal similarity matches are considered more similar than analogy matches; whilst surface 
matches are also considered more similar than For matches (Research Question) So it looks like both 
surface similarity contribute to subjective similarity. 
Thus as per the findings of this study, one can conclude with some level of plausibility that there 
are different types of analogies (similarity) that have differential effects on both access and inferential 
soundness. Whereas across-domain or far transfer analogy affects inference and elaboration, literal 
similarity or within-domain analogy has influence on retrievability.  
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